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Abstract
This paper presents on overview of the economics that lies behind social
interaction models and briefly discusses the empirical approaches to social
interactions.  We present a simple model with local interactions, similar to
Glaeser, Sacerdote and Scheinkman (1996) but using a continuous action space
and starting with optimizing behavior.  We then extend the model to include
both global and local interactions.  We suggest and use a methodology for using
variation of intra-city aggregates to identify the relative sizes of local and global
interactions.   We also present a model with endogenous location choice and
use the predictions of that model to identify the sources of cross-city variance
that are due to sorting and interaction.  Finally, we present a brief discussion of
using time-series to estimate the social interactions in broad aggregates.1
I.  Introduction
A growing literature has argued that many economic actions -- crime, education choice,
labor force participation, out-of-wedlock births-- are marked by social interactions (see
e.g. Akerlof, 1997, Becker, 1997, Bernheim, 1994, Young, 1997).
1  These social
interactions imply that the net private benefits from pursuing a particular activity rise as
others also pursue this activity.  For example, working hard in school might be less
painful for a young student if his friends are also studying, both because his friends can
help him learn and because his friends are not available for other leisure activities. These
interactions can take many forms, ranging from pure physical externalities (while one
person is being arrested, the police find it harder to arrest someone else), to learning
from one's neighbors, to stigma (the more people who are committing a particular
crime--the less likely is that crime to be a negative signal) to pure taste externalities
(individuals just enjoy imitating others).   We will discuss the many forms of these
externalities at length in Section II, but the primary focus of this essay is on measuring
the extent of social interactions, not on determining which mechanisms are most
important in generating them.
Social interactions are particularly important because they can help explain
striking shifts in aggregate outcomes over time and space.  There are a large number of
variables where shifts over time and space seem far too large to be explainable with
standard economic forces.  For example, Levitt (1997) shows that only 25 percent of
the massive crime increase from 1960 to 1975 can be explained by demographic shifts.
Mulligan (1995) argues that massive female labor force participation in World War II
cannot be explained by changes in either wages or the opportunity cost of time.2
Likewise the dramatic change in divorce rates or the rise in out-of-wedlock births (see
Akerlof, Katz and Yellen, 1996) all seem to be only partially connected to visible shifts
in observable variables.
2
Social interactions help to explain these changes, because of the strategic
complementarities inherent in social interactions.  These strategic complementarities
imply that even if changes in fundamentals create only a small change in the level of
activity for each individual, each individual's small change will then raise the benefits for
everyone else pursuing the activity.  The society-wide effect of a small change in
fundamentals, because of these ripple effects, may therefore be quite large.  Small
changes in fundamental variables can set off a cascade in individual behavior so that
large shifts in outcomes may result from tiny changes in fundamentals.
The rapid shifts in the variables that we mentioned earlier are of prime policy
interest.  The rise in female labor force participation is probably the most important
single shift in the post-war labor market.  The rise in crime over the 1960-75 period led
to a ten-fold increase in reported crime in many areas.  The rise in out-of-wedlock
births and the rise of divorce appear to have caused deep changes in our society.  To
the extent that theory and measurement of social interactions enables us to understand
these massive changes, the study of social interactions has potentially major policy
relevance.  Furthermore since social interactions usually imply the existence of
externalities, the presence of these interactions often suggests some scope for
government action.
  Indeed, we believe that non-market interactions between people represent most
of the human experience.  These interactions play a critical role in determining behavior,
preferences and utility.  Social interactions models of the type discussed in this paper3
and in this volume are one way of understanding the features of non-market interactions
that make them different from more standard interactions that work through market
transactions.  This paper focuses on one empirical approach to these interactions.
Measuring Social Interactions-- A Brief Literature Review
This paper focuses on a narrow set of issues in empirically measuring the size
and nature of social interactions.  There are several empirical approaches to
understanding these interactions.  There is a literature that includes Crane (1991), Case
and Katz (1991), Evans, Oates and Schwab (1992), Rauch (1994), Borjas (1995),
O'Regan and Quigley (1997) and many others that uses micro-data to examine these
connections.  The basic structure of this research often involves regressing an action of a
person on the average action of a person's "neighbors," where neighbors can mean
members of the individuals census tract or some self-reported social group.
There are three problems with this methodology, which are discussed at length
by Manski (1993).  First, if a person is affected by his neighbors, he also affects his
neighbors.  As such the supposedly independent variable (the neighbors' actions) is a
function of the dependent variable (the individual's actions).  Most recent research in this
area (see Case and Katz, 1991) addresses this problem by instrumenting for the
independent variable using the average levels of other neighbors' characteristics which
are supposedly exogenous (such as neighbor's parents characteristics).  Second, there
may be omitted variables in a particular area which affect the returns to the activity in
that area and which would induce a spurious correlation between individuals and
neighbor's actions, even if all individuals are immobile.  This problem is also potentially4
treatable using exogenous neighbor's characteristics as instruments for neighbor's
actions.
Third, individuals choose their neighborhoods and individuals who are likely to
do the same things may choose to live close one another, perhaps because of social
interactions.  Evans, Oates and Schwab (1992) address this problem by modeling the
choice of peer group as an endogenous variable.  They argue that standard peer group
effects disappear once the endogeneity of peer groups have been properly treated.
General solutions to all of these problems are enormously difficult to find in the
absence of controlled experiments, such as Gautreaux or Moving-to-Opportunity,
where individuals are actually randomized across neighborhoods.  Even these
experiments often suffer from the fact that we only observe individuals who chose to
join in the experiment or who decide not to turn down the opportunity to move to a new
neighborhood.  When individuals are selected based on moving, the results are clearly
biased because only persons who benefit from moving will choose to move.
Even clever solutions to this bias that use only the randomized part of the
experiment are problematic.  For example consider an experiment where randomized
individuals (perhaps those who draw an even number) are given the opportunity to
move to a new neighborhood and others aren't given that opportunity (perhaps those
who draw an odd number).  By using the number that the individual is given as an
instrument for neighborhood movement (thus not using whether or not the individual
actually moved), some of the worst part of the bias is eliminated.  Nevertheless, since
the only people who move are those who benefit from moving, the experiment never
tracks the full sample of possible movers.  Even the randomized treatment effect must5
be interpreted as estimating the benefit of having an option to move, not the benefit of
actually moving.
Brock and Durlauf (1997) represents a particularly comprehensive and careful
discussion of the use of micro-data to estimate social interactions.  In particular, they
focus on discrete choice problems often in a panel setting.  A major contribution is their
presenting a thorough discussion of when discrete choice models with social interactions
are actually identifiable.  Again, though, identification is shown by them to be extremely
difficult in many cases, especially when unobserved heterogeneity is particularly
important.
Another empirical approach to measuring social interactions relies on using only
aggregate information (see Brock and Durlauf, 1995, Glaeser, Sacerdote and
Scheinkman, 1996, Gaviria, 1997, Topa, 1997).  The intuition of this approach is that
since social interactions create high levels of variance across space and time, by using
the variance of aggregates, one can measure the extent of these interactions.  This
approach is free of the most basic endogeneity or reflection problem, because the
approach explicitly acknowledges the fact that all individuals effect each other.
However, it is free of neither the problem of omitted variables which vary across space,
nor of the problem of selection of different types of people into different areas.
Alternative approaches have been proposed by Glaeser, Sacerdote and
Scheinkman (1996) to address these problems.  We implicitly control for an area
specific fixed effects which eliminates some or most of the omitted variables problem.
We examine groups which are more or less mobile to see if there appears to be a
connection between mobility and measured social interactions, which there would be if
measured social interaction just reflected location choice.  We use "scaling" rules6
predicted by the theory that should allow us to differentiate between sorting and direct
interaction.  Finally, we use the variance of observables to determine the range of
reasonable estimates for the importance of unobservables.  While these corrections are
far from perfect, they do suggest that there are ways that this methodology can be made
useful.  We believe strongly that given the importance of estimating social interactions,
all possible methodologies should be used.  Even if the classic approach discussed first
was better in 90 percent of the cases (which we do not believe), there is still significant
value in using alternative methodologies which do not share exactly the same set of
problems (although they have problems of their own).
Topa (1997) also uses aggregate-level variables to study social spillovers in
employment status.  Formally he writes down a non-homogeneous version of a contact
process in which the probability of becoming employed, depends on both individual
characteristics and the number of one's neighbors who are employed.  The probability
of becoming unemployed depends only on individual characteristics.  The non-
homogeneity allows Topa (1997) to differentiate spatial sorting from spillovers, but it
also stops him from explicit derivations of the stationary distribution of the employment
process.  Instead, he uses the process of indirect inference where parameters are
estimated by minimizing a distance between actual data and simulations of the structural
model for different parameter values.  A principle feature of the Topa-model is that the
covariance between individuals--the degree of social interaction-- is determined by
spatial distance.   He estimates large quantities of spillovers using Chicago Census Tract
level information for 1980 and 1990.  He finds that spillovers are strongest for minorities
and individuals with less education.7
Brock and Durlauf (1995) do not present estimation based on aggregates, but
rather present a variety of theoretical results which are presented as a first step towards
empirical work.  They focus on a global interactions model and produce results on the
existence of multiple equilibria and the existence of threshold effects.8
Outline of this Paper
Our focus is one measuring the size and nature of social interactions.  Our
particular interest is in interactions where one person’s taking a particular action
increases the likelihood of another person also taking the same action.  We will
generally mean the term positive social interactions to refer to just this type of situation.
Most of the peer effects and interaction models discussed above (and discussed below)
can be said to have this basic structure.
Our primary interest is in empirically determining the size and nature of these
positive social interactions.  We are interested in the extent to which one person’s action
will effect his neighbor’s action.  We are interested in the extent to which this sort of
influence decays with geographic and social distance.   We are interested in the extent
to which individual interactions are increased and reduced as individuals choose the
social milieu in which they exist.  In principle, if social interactions are to be a major
piece of positive economics or policy prescriptions, this type of information is crucial.9
This paper extends our previous methodology is four ways, starting with Section
III.  First, we introduce a social interactions model with a continuous rather than a
discrete one-zero choice variable.  This change is useful for considering many variables
where outcomes are continuous, rather than discrete.  If we believe that the action is
continuous but that the econometrician only observes a discrete outcome, then this
continuous interaction model can be used for thinking about discrete variables.  We
present a new set of empirical results measuring the extent of social interactions for
these continuous variables.  One primary difference between continuous and discrete
variables is that to use continuous variables it is necessary to have a separate estimate of
the population variance of outcomes from micro data (in the case of discrete variables
with known mean level p, the population variance is always p(1-p)).
Our second section extends our previous work to include both local and global
interactions.  A local interaction occurs across neighbors.  A global interaction occurs
through an aggregate.  Classic examples of local interactions may include learning from
neighbors (as in Ellison and Fudenberg, 1995) or joint neighbor production of non-
work related activities.  Global interactions may include community-wide norms or
effects that work through the price mechanism.  Like local interactions, global
interactions produce high variances. Unlike local interaction models, global interactions
also naturally produce multiple equilibria, which local interactions do not as long as the
interaction from neighbor-to-neighbor decays sufficiently quickly. We demonstrate an
empirical methodology for considering multiple equilibria and other social interactions
jointly.  This methodology finds the existence of multiple equilibria for many variables,
but that the bulk of the variance across areas remains even after we have allowed for
the existence of multiple equilibria. Actually separating local from global interactions10
requires sub-area aggregates or micro data where individuals are matched to a peer
group below the global level.
Our third section presents a version of the model with both local interactions
and locational selection.  Individuals choose their areas to maximize utility based on
possibly limited information about their own tastes.  The variance across areas is then
based on the combination of locational decisions and social interactions (of course, the
local decisions are also based on the existence of social interactions).  The identification
of selection vs. social interaction hinges again on a scaling rule.  In other words, if we
know that people are selecting between sets of areas with different population sizes then
it is possible to differentiate between the two sources of cross-area variation.
Finally, we examine local and global interaction models in a dynamic context.
Following a large body of work on technology adoption, we note that the level of social
interaction determines the extent to which adoption is linear or S-shaped.  We present a
simple means of testing for the extent of social interaction in dynamic processes, but we
do not show how to determine between local and global interactions outside of using
simultaneously cross-sectional and time-series information.  We present a ranking
across a number of dynamic processes of which appear to be the most interactive.  In
general local interactions seem to generate somewhat slower dynamic change, and in
principle it may be possible to differentiate between the two theories just using time
series information given sufficient assumptions on functional form.
Our overall conclusion is that it still appears that there is substantial social
interaction in a large number of variables.  Some of this interaction creates multiple
equilibria, but most of the variance that social interaction creates occurs beyond these11
equilibria.  Differential selection into different areas is clearly particularly important, but
there is still variance beyond that caused by selective migration.12
II.  Discussion of Interactive Mechanisms
There is no shortage of the mechanisms that may generate social interactions of either
the local or the global variety.  Furthermore, while we will stress "positive" social
interactions, i.e. interactions where an individual’s action positively influences his
neighbors' actions, there are also many well-known cases of negative social interaction.
For example, competition for scarce resources is a form of a global negative interaction
which operates through the price system.  As one individual decides to consume more
of a particular commodity, that individual drives up the price and drives down
consumption of all others who also face that price.  Because of this force, we generally
expect to find positive social interactions in actions where there are not scarce resources
for which individuals are competing.  We loosely divide the mechanisms that generate
social interactions into four primary categories: physical, learning, stigma and taste-
related interactions.13
One reason to care about the different reasons why social interactions occur is
that there are different policy implications associated with different interactions.  For
example, if one person’s level of education increases his neighbor’s education through
dissemination of learning then it makes sense to subsidize education.  There is a socially
desirable spillover that should be subsidized.  However, different policy implications
appear if one person’s level of education increases his neighbor’s education for signaling
reasons, i.e. as one person gets more education the other person must also get more
education or be thought inferior.   In that case, there is a socially undesirable spillover
that should not be subsidized.  While we will not be able to delve into methods of
differentiating the sources of spillovers in this paper, this section stresses the wide range
of possible mechanisms and the extreme policy importance of recognizing the different
ways in which positive interactions might occur.
Physical and Learning Interactions
There are many forms of physical social interactions, even just within a single
activity.  For example, social interactions may occur in crime because of congestion in
law enforcement (as in Sah, 1991).  This force surely plays a significant role in riots,
where the large number of rioters lowers the probability of arrest (see DiPasquale and
Glaeser, 1997).  Increases in crime may lower the opportunity cost of legal activity
(because legal actors are being robbed) and may therefore lower the opportunity cost
of time and raise further the amount of criminal activity (as in Murphy et al., 1991).
These interactions may either be local or global depending on the range of criminals and
police.  For example if criminals attack legal businesses throughout the area, then this14
interaction is global.  If criminals only attack very close legal operations then the
interaction is local.
Network externalities are a classic physical interaction.  In these externalities, it
is more valuable to use a technology when others are using it as well.  For example,
telephones and e-mail become more valuable when others also have these
communication devices.  Cities themselves are networks and the existence, growth and
decline of urban agglomerations depend to a large extent of these interactions.
The presence of investment also can generate these physical interactions.
Investing in learning the QWERTY keyboard may only make sense when a large
fraction of keyboards follow this configuration.   Investing in an IBM versus a
Macintosh or a Betamax versus a VHS video recorder depends on the presence of
complements to use such as software or videocassettes.  These complements are much
more likely to abound when others are also using the technology.  As a result there is a
positive, global interaction that moves the nation to the extreme of using one or the other
technology (as in the case of VHS vs. Beta, see Arthur, 1989, for a discussion of
"historical lock-in") or an uneasy co-existence between two technologies (as in the case
of IBM and Macintosh).  In these cases, it has often been argued that suboptimal
equilibria often continue to exist supported by social interactions.
Other social interactions based on learning may occur if individuals actually  help
each other learn (as in Benabou, 1993).  In Young (1993), individuals learn by
observing past actions and learning produces convergence of strategies to a Nash
equilibria.  Having neighbors who are taking an action makes it easier to learn about this
action.  This learning may take the form of just learning that a new technology exists (as
in Griliches, 1958) or learning how to operate a technology correctly or learning the15
returns of this technology.  Again, depending on how the technology operates, the
interaction may either be local or global.  Ellison and Fudenberg (1993) explicitly
consider global learning where people interact with random members of a broad
population.  Ellison and Fudenberg (1995) examine local learning where people interact
with their near neighbors.  Fads and herding are other examples of behavior where
learning-related externalities can create social interactions (Banerjee, 1992,
Bikhchandani et. al. 1993).
Signaling and Taste Interactions
Interactions can also be generated through the desire to resemble outwardly the
group that is taking a particular action.  When actions are signals, then there is a natural
interaction that comes about because the value of a signal is a function of who else is
taking that signal.  For example, Rasmussen (1996) develops a model of stigma and
criminal behavior where more criminality tends to lower the stigma associated with
criminality.  As a result, more people become criminals.  Glaeser (1992) argues for
positive social interactions in labor market mobility, where more people changing firms
in high mobility countries (such as the U.S.) eliminates the stigma associated with rapid
mobility in low mobility countries (such as Japan).
Of course, the presence of signaling doesn't necessarily yield positive
interactions.  For some actions (particularly snob goods), greater participation
necessarily means that the action goes from being a positive signal to being a negative
signal (see e.g. Pesandorfer, 1996).  As more people perform the action, or consume
the snob good, there is less of a signaling demand for the product.  There is an inherent
asymmetry between actions which are demanded because they are positive signals and16
actions which are avoided because they are negative signals.  As more individuals
perform actions which are positive signals, the signal dissipates and the value of the
action disappears.  As more individuals perform actions which were once negative
signals, again the signal dissipates, but in this case the demand for the action will rise
with the disappearance of the signal.
To make this point clearly consider the following simple model where individuals
choose a discrete one-zero action.  There is a distribution of "quality" across people,
denoted q, and individuals want to resemble high quality individuals.  The value of the
action is a function (denoted W(.,.))of the average quality of people consuming the
action (denoted  ˆ  q ) and the quality of the individual  (denoted q i).   This value function
is a reduced form that is meant to capture the signaling value of the action.  Assuming
that W(.,.) is monotonic with respect to individual quality, equilibria will be defined with
a marginal individual, denoted with q *, who is indifferent over taking the action, i.e.
W(q*, ˆ  q ) = 0.
We can discuss two possible equilibria.  First, if ?W/?q i is always greater than
zero, then only individuals with quality greater than q * will take this action.  In this
case, an increase in the number of individuals who are taking the action (i.e.. a reduction
in q *) will lead to a reduction in the average quality level and an overall reduction of
demand for the action.  In this case, social interactions will lower variation in levels of
the action over space.    If ?W/?q i  is everywhere negative, then only individuals with
quality less than q * will take the action.  An increase in the number of people taking the
action will raise q * and increase demand for the action.  In this case, social interactions
are positive.  The implication is that social interactions should be particularly important in17
generating large variances across time and space for actions which stigmatize rather than
elevate.
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A second type of stigma model involves a community norm of behavior where
deviations are punished by the community (the rationality of this punishment strategy is
generated by repeated game or Folk theorem like arguments).  This community norm
may serve to eliminate negative externalities from particular types of behavior.  In this
case, as more people participate in the action, fewer people become available to
participate in the punishment and the costs of deviation become smaller.  Again, a
positive social interaction occurs because costs decline with the number of individuals
taking the action.
A variety of literature has also argued for the possibility that interactions enter
directly into the utility function.  Bernheim (1995) argued for a taste for conformity
where individuals experience a loss in utility just for deviating from the norms of the
crowd.  Akerlof (1997) examines a more general set of preferences where social
choices enter into the utility function.  Clearly, if the number of users of a commodity
enters directly into one's taste for a commodity, then there will be social interactions.
Much of the more casual discussion of these taste based preferences often
hinges upon people adopting the norms of behavior from others.   For example,
individuals think that certain types of behavior are "acceptable" because they see others
also following these forms of behavior.  By and large these stories can often be well
captured with learning models where agents learn optimal behavior from their neighbors
or with community-punishment types models.   However, some observers tend to think
that there is too much adherence to learned community norms to be justified by this type
of model.18
One alternative model assumes that individuals maximize a utility function which
is the sum of utility from standard consumption and from one's living up to one's ideal
self (this follows a long Freudian literature and is close to Akerlof and Kranton, 1997),
or Utility=U(X)+V(Z,Z), where X represents standard consumption variables and
Z is a stock variable that captures one's identity (i.e. Z could include years of education
or not being a liar or being thin).
There is a vast variety of things that individuals could care about being like (i.e.
in principle anything could influence Z), so in practice parental and community norms
must then determine which norms matter.  In the utility function, this is accomplished
with the Z term which is meant to capture the inputs from outside sources that
determine which actions individuals should base their self-image upon (i.e. how
important is it to be hard-working or clever or attractive or decent).  Social interactions
occur because through learning this ideal behavior, individuals influence each other.
Natural examples of this type of effect occurs in crowd behavior where individuals seem
to completely forego what is commonly thought of as civilized behavior because they
are sanctioned by the crowd (see for example the extensive literature on the motivation
of Nazis).
Of course, in any of these taste based theories we must try to understand what
function these tastes would be playing in an evolutionary setup.  Evolution should
optimally just give individuals the actual evolutionary utility function (maximize DNA
propagation) and enough intelligence to do this well.  Clearly evolution isn't able to do
this exactly and every set of combinations of tastes and computing ability is some
solution to a second best problem.  Interdependent preferences, if they exist, are surely
solving some evolutionary problem.  In particular, they may be acting to help get the19
optimal degree of social learning.  However, without a better idea of the costs that
stymie evolution just making people optimal social learners, we cannot tell why this
particular form of utility would have evolved.
III.  A Simple Model of Local Interactions
The following model description somewhat generalizes the model in the text of Glaeser,
Sacerdote and Scheinkman (1996) in allowing for a richer action space on the part of
individuals.  Individual i now chooses an action A(i) from a subset of the line.
Individuals are arranged on a one-dimensional lattice (a circle or line) and the choice of
an individual's action is based entirely on his own taste for the action and his taste for
imitating his predecessor on the line.  More precisely, a fraction of individuals (1-p)
receive sufficient utility from copying their predecessor that they will exactly imitate their
predecessor's actions.  The remaining individuals will choose their action independently;
we will refer to these individuals as fixed agents.  The mean action taken by these fixed
agents is m A  and the variance is s A
2.
If the probability of being a fixed agent is i.i.d. over the lattice, then in the
equilibrium of this model two agents who are separated by K other agents, will either do
exactly the same thing if there are no fixed agents between them (which occurs with
probability (1-p)
K) or they will choose their actions independently if there is a fixed
agent between them (which occurs with probability 1-(1-p)
K).  Thus, the covariance
between two such agents equals (1-p)
K times s A
2.   Using this fact, elementary
algebra reveals that the sum of the city's actions, when divided by the square root of the
city size, satisfies:20
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This implies that the variance of normalized city averages will go to s A
2 in the
case where there are only fixed agents or go to infinity in the case where there are no
fixed agents.
An Alternate Model
An alternative and equivalently simple model, which is somewhat more
appealing in its assumptions about individual behavior, but is somewhat less appealing in
its restrictions on the action space assumes that the actions space is the real line.  In this
case, we can assume that individuals' utility is a function of their own tastes, their actions
and their predecessors actions:
(2) U A i,Ai-1,Qi ( )=Q iA i -
1-a
2
A i
2 -
a
2
A i - A i-1 ( )
2
,
so that the marginal utility of the action for individual i is directly influenced by an
idiosyncratic taste shock Qi, and by his neighbors' action, A i-1.  In order to
incorporate observable individual characteristics into the formula, we define
   Qi =qi + f X i ( ), where q i has mean 0 and variance sq
2 (which is constant across
cities), and Xi is the individual’s set of observable characteristics which may include
individual level characteristics (e.g. age and gender) and city-level characteristics (e.g.
spending on welfare).  We write  f X ( ) for the mean level of the function f(.) and  f X ( )j
for the mean level of the function f(.)  in city  j.21
In this case, the individual's action is defined by  A i =qi + f Xi ( )+aA i-1, or
equivalently:
(3)    A i - A j =qi + f Xi ( )- f X ( )j +a A i-1 - Aj ( ),
where A j is the mean action level in city j.  The variance of an individuals' actions can
be found by noting that equation (3) and the fact that conditional on city j,    f X i ( ) is
independent of       Ai-1 (this uses our assumption that there is no sorting across
neighborhoods within cities):
(4)  Var(A i - Aj) =sq
2 +Var j
f (X) +a
2Var(Ai-1- A j) =
sq
2 +Var j
f( X)
1-a
2 ,
since in equilibrium Var(A i - Aj) =Var(A i-1- A j), and where Var j
f (X) refers to the
variance of f(X) within city j.  As long as the X variables are independently distributed,
then the correlation coefficient between individuals who are separated by K other
individuals is now a
K.  As N grows large, a version of equation (1) again holds:
(5)   Var
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N
A(i) -
f(X)j
1-a
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In general, we will assume that Var j
f (X) is constant across cities.
In order to determine the underlying parameters, if the econometrician observed
the variance of 
1
N
A(i)-
f(X) j
1-a
￿ 
Ł 
￿  ￿ 
ł 
￿ 
i=1
N
￿  (denoted Varagg) and the population variance22
of A within cities (denoted Varind-- which is assumed to be constant across cities), then
it is clear that in the limit a =
Varagg -Varind
Varagg +Varind
 , and given our estimate of a and
Var j
f (X) it is possible to estimate sq
2.
This model requires more modification for discrete action spaces.  One
interpretation is to assume that there is a latent continuous variable that expresses only in
measurable discrete units.  For example, individuals may choose a continuous quantity
of criminality that displays itself in a discrete value, whether or not the individual was
arrested or individuals choose a continuous level of sexual behavior that displays itself in
the number of out-of-wedlock births.  For this model to be technically correct, it must
be true that neighbors observe and make their decisions based on the actual continuous
variable, not the discrete outcome.
Methodological Discussion
The fundamental empirical idea of this methodology is to use the relationship
between the variance of community level aggregates and the variance of individual data
to estimate the size of the social interactions.  Our first step is to estimate the variance of
action levels within cities.  To do this, we allow for city-specific means and just estimate
a common variance of the action around these city-specific means.
Next we assume the f(X) = b’X  and we estimate 
a
b
-
¢
1
 by regressing sample
average action outcomes on sample average city level characteristics (including state
effects which should eliminate the effect of state level laws and regulations.):23
(6)    j
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Using the predicted value from this regression, we obtain a value of 
a
b
-
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With these estimates, the predicted levels of outcomes across cities based on city level
variables, we can estimate the variance of  ￿
= ￿
￿
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a .  This aggregate
variance and the individual variance are sufficient to estimate a.
If we are interested in differentiating between variance caused by observables
(Var j
f (X)) and variance caused by idiosyncratic tastes (sq
2), we must then assume that
there is no sorting within the city.  Then we can estimate the regression using the 1990
Census Public Use Micro Sample to estimate a regression of the form
i i i X Effect Fixed City A e b + + =
' .  The city fixed effect will eliminate any bias that
comes from differential sorting of individuals across cities.
4  With this regression, we
have now estimated the coefficients b, on individual level characteristics.  Given these
coefficients, we form a value of b’X for the all individuals and we can calculate the value
of Var j
f (X), by calculating the variance of this predicted action level within cities.
Some Results
Table 4.1 presents our first set of results for female headed household rates.
This variable represents the share of all families that are headed by a woman.  This can
be thought of as roughly the share of women who "choose" to have a family without a
husband, conditional upon choosing to have a family (there are very few male headed
households without a woman).  All of our data comes from the 1990 census summary24
tape files.  Our unit of observation is the metropolitan statistical area (MSA or when
applicable the primary metropolitan statistical area).
Our goal is to estimate a -- the parameter which captures the degree of social
interaction.  This basic formula for this parameter is that a =
Varagg -Varind
Varagg +Varind
. where
   Varagg and    Varind are the aggregate and individual level variances described above.
The first row in Table 4.1 shows the individual and aggregate level variances
when no observables are allowed as control variables.  The individual level variance is
the variance from a national mean.  In this case we find an a  value of .998, which is
extremely close to one and quite far from zero.
The second row shows results where we have controlled for city level variables
in calculating the city aggregate variance and calculated the individual level variances
from a city-level mean.  A wide battery of city level variables have been included which
are described in the Table.  While many of these variables may be endogenous, our goal
is to control for as much as possible rather than to include only exogenous variables.
Both the individual variance and the aggregate variance decline, but the aggregate
variance declines by much more.  The estimate of a  thus falls to .995, which still
represents quite sizable levels of social interaction.  This level of a  implies that the
actions of individuals who are separated by 100 other individuals have a correlation
coefficient of .606.
The third row gives results where we calculate the aggregate variance
controlling for city level variables and state level fixed effects.  These state level fixed
effects should control for any omitted state level legal variables effecting this outcome
variable.  As expected the aggregate variance declines substantially, beyond our
controls for city level variables.  The individual level variance is still estimated around25
city level means and the overall value of a declines to .987, which implies that the
correlation coefficient of actions of individuals who are separated by 100 other
individuals is .27.
An Aside on Multi-Dimensional Interaction Models
Glaeser, Sacerdote and Scheinkman (1996) presents a variant on the voter
model of physics (e.g Kindermann and Snell, 1980).  Agents were located at points on
a one-dimensional lattice and chose one of two possible actions.  In our model, there
were fixed agents who choose their actions at random.  The other type, imitative agents,
copied the action of one of their two neighbors with equal probability.  Without fixed
agents, the voter model in one (or two) dimensions produces unanimity in the long run
and this unanimity is clearly inaccurate empirically for many variables.  More precisely,
suppose the agents are in Zd, the set of points in Rd with integer coordinates, and that
each agent chooses at time t, an action ai
t ˛ 0,1 { }.  At time zero, each agent chooses
an action that is independent of other agents with  Pr ob ai
t =1 { }= p.  The neighbors of
an agent i ˛Zd are given by  N(i)= j ˛Zd:max l=1,...,d i
l - j
l =1 { }.  For each i ˛Zd
there exists a Poisson process Pi with rate g with Pi independent of Pj and such that at
each epoch t, the agent revises his action.  Assume in addition that if agent i revises his
action then ai
t = aj
t with probability 
1
# N(i)
 for each  j˛N(i).  That is, i copies the
action of one of his neighbors at each epoch t.  If d=1,2 for any i ˛Zd,  j ˛Zd there
exists an e>0, there exists T such that if t>T , Prob ai
t = a j
t { }>1-e .  In other words,
in one or two dimensions, agents behavior will eventually be unanimous.26
However, if d=3, unanimity no longer holds and there exists a stationary
measure m(p) and if Sn =
ai - p
2n +1 ( )
d ( )
1/2+1/d i £ n ￿  then Sn ﬁ N 0,s
2 [ ].  This formula
suggests that empirically, one could in principle estimate the number of dimensions that
explain the observed variance of group-level average actions.  The larger the dimension
of the interactions, the lower is the exponent (1/2+1/d) that must be used to normalize
to get a normal distribution.  In the limit as d grows, the exponent approaches 1/2.
Thus, the higher dimension lattices increasingly resemble the case where decisions are
independent.  Intuitively, sufficiently large amounts of interaction eliminate the tendency
of interaction to produce all-or-nothing outcomes.  Another way of generating scaling
rules other than scaling by 1/2 involves models with long spatial dependency (Glaeser
and Scheinkman, 1997).
III.  Combining Local and Global Interactions
In this case, we assume that utility depends both upon the actions of a neighbor
and of the community as a whole.  The community average can either increase or
decrease the incentives to engage in the particular level of behavior.  A globally high
level of crime may mean that many voters are criminals who do not want to spend on
police expenditures.  Alternatively, a high community-wide level of crime may reduce
the incentives to engage in crime.  Also perhaps, as more people are criminals, there
may be fewer potential victims, so the returns to crime in the community may fall (again
this is only a global interaction if criminals choose their victims from a global rather than
a local pool).27
To formally treat global interactions, we again assume that action levels are
continuous and that individuals choose their actions treating the global levels as
exogenous to maximize:
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Both a  and j  are strictly less than one and greater than zero (when j =1 this is the
pure local interactions model discussed above).  As before to make the system
symmetric A0 = A n.  We will also treat two separate assumptions about the taste
shocks.  First, we assume that Qi =qi whereq i is i.i.d., with mean that we normalize to
zero and variance sq
2.  Second, we assume that Qi =qi + f Xi ( ), where q i is again
i.i.d. with mean zero and variance sq
2, and X refers to observable characteristics of the
individual.  In both cases, the variable Qi is assumed to have a bounded support.  The
function g(.) is bounded and continuously differentiable with a bounded derivative.28
For any given sequence  Qi { }i=1
n
, we can define a function  F:R
n ﬁ Rn that
maps the vector  A0,...,A n -1 ( ) by:
(9)
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Here A0 = A n.  As a <1, j<1 and g(.) is bounded, the function will have at least one
fixed point which will solve equation (5).  In general, however, there is no guarantee that
this fixed point is unique.  It is entirely possible that there exist multiple solutions to
equation (8).  Further, the optimal action of agent i depends on the total population size
n and we denote this dependence by writing  A i
n for the action taken by individual i.
Summing equation (8), and writing 
n
A
A
n
i
n
i
n
1 ˆ = ￿
=  we find:
(10) (1-af) ˆ  A  n -
a(1- f)
n
￿
i=1
n
[g(
￿k„i A k
n
n -1
)] =
￿i=1
n Qi
n
Further iteration of equation (8) yields:
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At this point, we will separate our discussion into two sections, based on our
two assumptions about Q.29
Case 1: Qi =qi
We will assume that there are a finite number of solutions to the equation
g(x) =
1-aj
a 1-j ( )
x  and that at each such solution g'(x) „
1-aj
a 1-j ( )
. This is a “generic”
assumption.
In the appendix, we show that the sequence  ˆ  A  n, of average actions in a
population of size n, converges, as n ﬁ ¥, to a solution of the equation:
(12) g(A ) =
1-af
a(1-f)
A .
We denote ai
n = A i
n - A, and we also show in the appendix that:
(13)
ai
n
n
ﬁ N 0,
sq
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1-aj -a(1-j) ¢  g  A ( ) ( )
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Within city variance (using equation (8)) is 
sq
2
1-a
2j
2 .  It is somewhat
meaningless to try and determine between the effects of a , j , and  ¢  g  A ( ), but even if
we attempt to distinguish between sq
2, aj,  ( ) A g¢ - ) 1 ( j a , it is impossible without
more information.  Essentially we have three variables and only two equations.
If we had an additional variable, for example the covariance of actions of
individual i and i-1 within a city, then we could back out these three variables. Within a
given city, cov A i,A i-1 ( )= ajVar(A i-1) =
ajsq
2
1-a
2j
2 . This covariance can be either30
found directly (if micro-data is available) or found by city-subaggregates (i.e.
neighborhood level averages).  In this case, aj equals the correlation coefficient of two
neighbor's actions, and by using the variance, sq
2 can be found.  With these two
parameters, it is possible to determine the size of the global interaction by looking at
variances across cities.
Alternatively, one could identify the model by examining the variance of
neighborhood level averages within a single city.  If a neighborhood has size h, then
conditioning on the city level mean, Var
Aj j=i
i+ h ￿
h
￿ 
Ł 
￿ 
￿ 
ł 
￿ =
sq
2
1-aj ( )
2 .   The only difference
between this expression and equation (13) is that all neighborhoods within a city are
affected by the same global interaction term, so there are no terms involving g'(A).
If it is desirable to control for observables and still use this simpler framework, a
simple assumption is that observed action Y=A+f(X), where Y is the observed action
and f(X) is a function of observables.  Thus A can be inferred by subtracting f(X) from
Y, if f(X) is known (and given our assumption, there is no reason why it cannot be
estimated from either micro-level or aggregate-level regressions).  All of the statements
about A are unchanged with this assumption.  Empirically, it is necessary to work with
Y-f(X), the residuals from a first stage regression.  This framework allows for a simple
manner of controlling for observables.  However, it is not satisfying in that we are
assuming that one's influence on one's neighbors is only a function of unobservable
factors.   The next section introduces a more complicated setup, where we allow
observables to influence neighbors.
Case 2: Qi =qi + f Xi ( )31
In this case, we assume that taste shocks contain both an individual specific,
i.i.d. component, and also a component that is based on an individual's observable
characteristics and a component based on city level characteristics (which may include
both individual-specific and city-specific attributes).  We assume that Qi has a second
moment.  Using a similar logic to the one used in Case 1, and making an analogous
assumption concerning the finiteness of the set of solutions to the equation
( ) j X f x g x ) ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( = - - - j a aj  one can show that, in the limit, the mean level of
the action in city  j must satisfy:
(14)   (1-aj)A j -a(1-j)g Aj ( )= f (X) j
Equation (14) typically has many solutions for each value of  f (X) j.  From now on, we
condition on a "branch" of the solution and note that except for a finite set of values of
f (X) j, the solutions will vary smoothly with  f (X) j within each branch. Importantly, for
each value of  j A  there exists at most one  f (X) j that solves the equation.  Thus, in
principle one can estimate  f (X) j as a function of    A j.
Using the implicit function theorem and differentiating (14) implies:
(15)
¶ f(X) j
¶Aj
=(1-aj)-a(1-j) ¢  g  Aj ( )
Thus the derivative of predicted value with respect to outcome level will yield an
estimate of       (1-aj)-a(1-j) ¢  g  A ( ).  The connection between realized outcome, and
predicted outcome based on micro-level variation, gives us an estimate of the extent to
which there are spillovers.32
If we assume that the distribution of X is constant across neighborhoods such
that the average level of f(X) in each neighborhood within city  j is  f (X) j.  Then
(16)
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where h again indices the members of the neighborhood.    Furthermore, the variance of
action levels within the city will again equal 
     
sq
2 +Varj
f(x)
1- aj ( )
2 .  The variance of
neighborhoods, and the variance of individual level actions within cities allows us to
identify  aj.  Thus, as we learn       (1-aj)-a(1-j) ¢  g  A j ( ) from the aggregate
regressions we are able to separate the extent to which spillovers come from local and
global sources, after we condition in an equilibrium.
Unfortunately this approach requires us to assume that there is no sorting by
observables across neighborhoods.  If we actually were able to run individual level
regressions within cities with neighborhood level fixed effects, we could then drop this
assumption.  Then we could note that       (1-aj) A h - A j ( )= f(X)h - f(X)j, where
quantities with the h subscript indicate neighborhood level outcomes.  The relationship
between predicted outcomes and actual outcomes then provide a separate estimate of
   (1-aj) .
A Discrete Version
Since many of our variables are discrete, it makes sense to consider an
analogous model where only two actions {0, 1} are possible.  For simplicity we only
describe the model in the case without observables.  In this case, assume that a city has33
n agents on a circle.  With probability a, agent i bases his actions exclusively on the
actions of agent i-1, and we again identify agent 0 with agent n.  With probability 1-a,
agent i bases his action on the global average.   In this case, the probability that agent i
chooses action 1 is given by g
Aj j„i ￿
n -1
￿ 
Ł 
￿ 
ł  where g(.) is a continuously differentiable
function defined for x˛ 0,1 [ ] with 1>g(x)>0.  Following a similar reasoning to that of
the previous model, we may conclude that the average action in a city must converge as
n ﬁ ¥ to some solution of the equation  A= g A ( ).  Furthermore the variance of
normalized city-level averages satisfies Var
a j j=i
i+ n ￿
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Of course the variance of any one individuals action is A(1- A).  These three equations
allow us to empirically identify the model.  We will estimate the parameters for discrete
variables as if they were continuous variables in the next section, but more properly
discrete variables need to be treated differently using this particular formulation.
Empirical Implementation
This section employs two distinct methodologies.  The first methodology
assumes that observable variables do not create spillovers and can just be controlled for
and then ignored.  The second methodology assumes that observable variables create
their own spillovers.  For both methodologies, we can estimate the value of    (1-aj)
by using the micro-level variance and the variance of neighborhood averages.  If we
assume that the observables can just be subtracted, we begin by regressing outcomes34
on observables (in a micro-level regression) and then using those coefficients to subtract
the effect of observables from any aggregate.
Methodology 1-- Social Influence comes only from Unpredictable Elements of
Decisions
The first methodology relies upon the assumption that we can ignore the effect
of observables on social interactions.  In this case, we first regress our micro-outcome
variable (does the family have a single head) on a battery of family level characteristics
including city level fixed effects.  This regression furnishes us with estimates of the effect
of observable characteristics on the outcome variable and using these estimates we
correct tract-level and city-level outcome variables for observable characteristics.  As
discussed earlier, because of sorting across cities, observable characteristics may be
correlated with the action of one's neighbors and as such either city level regressions or
micro-level regressions that do not control for city level fixed effects may well be
biased.  Of course, we are, unrealistically, forced to assume that there is no sorting
within cities.
Thus, all further procedures within this methodology are done using corrected
female headed household rates where the effect of observable characteristics have been
eliminated (except for the row marked "raw female headship rate in families" and Table
4.3a).    Using the corrected city level female headship rates, we then determine how
much of the variance across cities can be plausibly explained by the existence of multiple
equilibria (of normalized city averages) and how much can be determined by the
variance of cities within each of these equilibria.  While the variance created by the35
multiple equilibria is not the only variance due to global interactions, in our model it
represents one component of the global interactions.
Of course, this result is due to the assumption that the global interaction may be
non-linear while the local interaction is linear.  If the global interaction was linear, then it
could not generate multiple equilibria.  If the local interaction was non-linear, then even
in the absence of global interactions, multiple equilibria could still exist.  Perhaps it is
therefore wiser to interpret the amount of variance created by multiple equilibria as the
variance associated with non-linearities in the interaction process rather than as the
outcome of global interactions.
We allow for the presence of multiple equilibria by using the EM algorithm to fit
a mixture of normal distributions to the observed distribution of corrected city level
headship rates.   Tables 4.3a, 4.3b and 4.3c show the results of estimating multiple
equilibria via the EM algorithm for female headed household rates.   This algorithm
allows us to estimate that each city is drawn from up to five distributions with different
means and standard deviations.  Since the data is always fit better by more distributions,
a loss function must be specified so that we allow more distributions only if a sufficiently
large amount of explanatory power is generated by allowing for an extra distribution.
We implement this loss function using the Akaike Information Criterion which allows us
to compare across numbers of distributions to determine which one gives us the most
explanatory power relative to its criterion.
In Table 4.3a, we estimate the number of distributions for percent female
headed household without any additional controls.  In this case, the Akaike Information
Criterion is minimized with three component distributions.  The first distributions, which
contains 55 percent of the cities, has a low mean and a variance roughly comparable to36
the aggregate variance.  The second distribution has 42 of the distribution and a much
lower variance, which leads to a correspondingly lower value of social interactions for
this group.  The third distribution has only 3 percent of the cities, but it also has an
extremely high mean and variance.
In Table 4.3b we again control for city level variables in estimating the aggregate
variance term.  The EM algorithm is used on the distribution of female headed
household rates across cities after we have first orthogonalized these rates to a battery
of city level characteristics.  In this case, the three component distribution again
minimizes the Akaike Information criterion.  In Table 4.3c, we orthogonalize city level
female headed household rates with respect to city level variables and with respect to
state level fixed effects.  The average aggregate variance is reduced much less by
allowing for the presence of multiple equilibria.  In this case the Akaike Information
Criterion is minimized with two component distributions.  The first distribution has 78
percent of the cities and the second distribution has 22 percent of the cities.
Once we have estimated the number of distributions that best fit the data, we
use the variance of the city level aggregates around each distribution to estimate the
degree of local and global interactions.  Notice that the reduction in variance created by
allowing the presence of multiple equilibria is already one sign that global equilibria
matter.    Table 4.2 shows the results from this procedure for female headship rates.
We use the average city-level variance rather than the variance for each one of the
component distributions in order to produce a single set of results.    We use the three
formulas 
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2 , 
     
Var ind =
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2
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2 , and37
     
Var city =
sq
2
1-aj -a(1-j) ¢  g  A ( ) ( )
2  to estimate the key parameters of the model:
aj (which captures the importance of local interactions) and       a(1-j) ¢  g  A ( ) (which
captures the importance of global interactions, after we condition in an equilibrium).
Our findings, shown in Table 4.2, are that allowing for multiple equilibria and
global interactions substantially reduces the importance of local interactions in female
headship rates.  The value of aj is comparable to the value of a  in Table 4.1, with
only local interactions, and it is clear that including global interactions has lessened the
importance of social interactions.  However, after conditioning in an equilibrium, the
importance of local interactions is much higher than the importance of global
interactions.  We find that an increase in your neighbor's action is more than twelve
times more important than an increase in the city level average (which is found by
comparing aj-- the effect of the neighbor-- with       a(1-j) ¢  g  A ( ) the effect of the city
level average).  Of course, we are really differentiating between city-level and tract-level
interactions, are we are referring to tract-level interactions as local interactions.  It might
be that tract-level interactions are not actually local as described by our model, i.e.
neighbor-to-neighbor.  Instead, the tract-level interactions that we identify as local might
occur equally across the tract, i.e. individuals are influenced by the average level of
behavior in their tract. Table 4.3 exhibits parameter estimates for global vs. local
interaction models for several other variables.
Methodology 2-- Allowing Control Variables to Influence Interactions
The previous methodology assumes that only the unpredictable component of
actions creates social interactions.  In this section, we rely upon the fact that the38
component of individuals’ actions that are attributable to observable characteristics will
have exactly the same social interaction effect as the components of individuals’ actions
that are not attributable to any observable characteristics.  If observable characteristics
influence neighbors, but not as strongly as unobservable characteristics then neither one
of these procedures is correct and some mixture of the two procedures is best.
Table 4.4 presents an estimation of the strength of global interactions for female
headship rates. To estimate aj we use exactly the same procedure as we did above.
First we regress micro-outcomes on observables and then we use the parameter
estimates from this regression to correct for observable characteristics.  We then
estimate the individual level variance and the tract level variance and using
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2 , and 
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2  we form an estimate of aj.
Our estimate of global interactions is more difficult.  As discussed above, we
use the parameter estimates from the micro regression to create a predicted outcome
level for each city based on the city level observables and the parameter estimates from
the micro level regression.  We then regress this city-wide predicted action level on the
action.  If there were substantial non-monotonicities in this function, then multiple
equilibria would be a possibility.  As it is, the function is completely monotonic and thus
this procedure does not confirm the existence of multiple equilibria at the city level.
Intuitively, the result of regressing predicted outcomes on actual outcomes can
be best thought by considering the null hypothesis of no social interactions.  In that case,
we would expect the predicted outcome level to move one for one with the actual
outcome level (on average).  However, as we see we find that the predicted outcome
level moves less than one-for-one, which means that large changes in the actual39
outcome level are associated with smaller changes in the predicted outcome level.  This
finding is quite supportive  of the existence of social interactions.
However, our formula is that 
     
¶ f(X)
¶A
=1-aj -a(1-j) ¢  g  A ( ).  Our point
estimates of 
     
¶ f(X)
¶A
 range from .386 to .792, but our estimate of aj (from the micro-
level and tract-level variance) is .927.  As such, the global interaction terms must be
negative (although in one case, the global interaction term is not statistically different
from zero).   There are two possible ways of interpreting this result.  First, it is possible
that the global interaction terms are negative.
Second, and we think more realistically, there are problems associated with the
fact that we are cobbling together two different procedures to estimate the global and
local interaction.  In principle it would be possible to estimate aj by regressing
average tract level predicted outcome on average tract level outcome.  If there is any
tendency of the unobservable causes of actions to create more social interaction than
the observable components then our current estimate of aj will be much higher than it
would be using this alternative method.  Also, if unobservable causes of actions matter
more than our using of two procedures will lead to many more estimation problems than
using a common procedure to estimate both components of local and global
interactions.
This section has been highly exploratory and we hope that future work will
extend this approach.  However, we have argued that there are two distinct
methodologies for estimating local and global interactions.  First, it is possible to use
aggregate variances and compare these variances with micro-level variances.  Second,
it is possible to use the connection between average predicted level outcome and40
average outcome.  While this second point is similar to micro-level estimation techniques
(see, e.g. Case and Katz, 1991) which look for social interactions by using neighbors
characteristics as instruments, our procedure is essentially novel in many ways and
needs more development before it can be counted on to produce reliable results.
IV. Selection into Locations
We now revert back to our simpler local interactions model and assume
(2') U A i,Ai-1,qi,Pz ( )=qiAi -
1-a
2
A i
2 -
a
2
Ai - Ai-1 ( )
2
- Pz
where Pz represents the cost of living in city z.  As before, individuals choose their
actions so that A i =qi +aAi-1.  In this model, however, individuals choose their city as
well as their action.  Furthermore, they will choose their city before observing who their
neighbor will be or even exactly what their value of q i will be.  One justification for this
is that individual tastes will change over time (so individuals are unsure as to what their
tastes will be).  We further assume that no one knows who his neighbor will be.
However, individuals will have a guess as to what sort of people are selecting into the
city.
To implement the idea that individuals have some imperfect knowledge about
their own tastes, we assume  q i = ˆ  q  i +ei, where  ˆ  q  i and e i are both mean zero, i.i.d.
random variables with variances  s ˆ  q 
2 and se
2, and suppose g solves  1-g ( )s ˆ  q 
2 = gse
2.
The term  ˆ  q  i represents tastes that are known ex ante and may include the effect of
observable individual characteristics.  The term e i represents individual tastes that are
only known after migration which are assumed to be independent of all other individuals'41
taste shocks.  There are a fixed number of C cities labeled 1 to C and all of these cities
are ex ante identical (this represents a simplification over the previous models).
Furthermore, while it is possible to endogenize the size of communities (as long as cost
of living rises sufficiently quickly with population size there will always be interior
solutions for city size), we will assume that the fractions of the population  k1,...,kC ( ) are
exogenous.
Using the fact that individual i knows that he will choose his actions optimally so
that A i =qi +aAi-1, the expected utility of individual i who chooses city after observing
ˆ  q  i will be:
(17)  E Ui|z ( )=
ˆ  q  i
2 + se
2
2
+a ˆ  q  iE A i-1|z ( )-
1-a ( )a
2
E Ai-1
2 |z ( )- Pz
The key point in this equation is that there is a strategic complementarity
between an individual's expected proclivity towards the action ( ˆ  q  i) and the tendency in
the city to follow the action.  For example if agent i weakly prefers city z to city z',
where E Ai-1|z ( )> E A i-1| ¢  z  ( ) then any agent i' for whom  ˆ  q ¢  i  > ˆ  q  i will prefer z strictly to
z'.  This fact implies that there will be strict sorting of individuals across cities, unless the
cities are exactly identical (as in Benabou, 1993).  Without getting into more detailed
dynamic issues, usual ad hoc notions of stability assure us that these symmetric equilibria
will be unstable.  The intuition of this is that if one of two initially symmetric cities
becomes slightly higher in expected action levels, then all of the individuals with higher
ˆ  q  is will tend towards that city.   Because of this instability of the symmetric equilibria
cases, we will focus exclusively on the stable complete sorting equilibria.42
The determination of which cities will be high action and which will be low
action is not determined by the model.  We will normalize and order the cities so that
expected action levels rise monotonically with z.  We let l z  denote the highest skill level
in city z.  Naturally, l z <l z+1 and in equilibrium if  ˆ  q  i ˛ l z-1,l z ( ) then individual i lives
in city z.  For simplicity we will assume that the distribution  ˆ  q  i has a density function
f(.), so we will not worry about individuals at the boundary.  Since individuals at the
boundary need to be indifferent between the two cities, if mass points are present we
may assign a convenient fraction of the agents of that type to each city.
Formally, an equilibrium is a vector Inf( ˆ  q ) =l 0,l1,l2,...,lC -1,lC = Sup( ˆ  q )
and a vector p1,p2,...,pC-1, pC such that (1) if  ˆ  q  i ˛ lz -1,l z [ ] then  E Ui|z ( )‡ E Ui| ¢  z  ( )
for each z'=1, ... C, and (2) Probability ˆ  q  i ˛ lz-1,l z [ ] ( )=kz for each z=1,..., C.   The
existence of an equilibrium is easy to show.  The model does not pin down the level of
property values, only the difference of housing costs across cities, so we will
normalize p1 =0.
We denote q z = E ˆ  q  i z ( )= E qi z ( ) and Az = E A iz ( ).  Using the first order
condition  A i =qi +aAi-1, since E Ai z ( )= E A i-1z ( ), it follows that q z = 1-a ( )Az.
We further let A i
z (q i
z) denote the action (taste shock) associated with individual i in
city z and note that city z has nz = kzT inhabitants, where T denotes the total population
of the country.  Since  ˆ  q  i has a finite variance, it follows that:
(18)
Ai
z - Az
nz i=1
n j
￿ -
1
1-a
qi
z -q z
nz i=1
nz
￿ ﬁ N 0,
s z
2
1-a ( )
2
￿ 
Ł 
￿  ￿ 
ł 
￿ .43
where s z
2 is the overall variance of q i
z.   We know that sz
2 = ˆ  s  z
2 +se
2, where  ˆ  s  z
2 is
the variance of the signal q i
z in city z, which must satisfy
ˆ  s  z
2 = ˆ  q -q z ( ) lz-1
l z ￿
2 f ˆ  q  ( )
kz
dˆ  q = ˆ  q  l z-1
lz ￿
2 f ˆ  q  ()
kz
d ˆ  q -q z
2
.
We now let wz =
1
1-a
q i
z
nz i=1
nz
￿ =
1
1-a
qi
z -q z
nz
+
i=1
nz
￿
q z nz
1-a
.  This term
reflects the weighted average of taste shocks in city z.  By analogy to equation (18), the
variance of wz  is equal asymptotically to the variance of the normalized sum of the
deviations of actions of individuals in city z from the average action of the population.
We assume that the ratio of any one's city population to the average city population
(denoted  ˆ  n  z ) is bounded from above and below by two constants K 1  and K2 , so that
K 1 <
nz
ˆ  n  z
<K2.
The variance of the random variable  nzwz = kzTw z.  the weighted variance
of the wz  terms, equals:
(19)   CVar kzwz ( )= C
TVar kzq z ( )
(1-a)
2 + CE
kzsz
2
(1-a)
2
￿ 
Ł 
￿  ￿ 
ł 
.
In this equation, the moments can be computed against the measure that attributes
probability 1/C to each of the C cities.
The second term of the right hand side of equation (19), equals
se
2 + E ˆ  q 
2 ( )- kzq z
2
z=1
C
￿
(1-a)
2 .  It then follows that:
(20) Var C kzwz ( )=
1
(1-a)
2 se
2 +E ˆ  q 
2 ( )+ nz -1 ( )kzq z
2
z=1
C
￿
Ø 
º  Œ 
ø 
ß  œ .44
Intuitively, this equation makes it clear that the variance of weighted city level averages
is determined by the overall level of interaction, the variance of taste shocks, and the
amount of sorting across cities.
The first two terms in brackets are generally invariant with respect to increases
in C.  The third term is generally of order T/C (which is average city size).  If the
support of q is bounded, then the last term is at most of order T/C.  Further, as
K 1 <
nz
ˆ  n  z
<K2 implies that K 1 / N <kz we can place a lower bound on q z provided
that j=N/4 or j=3N/4.  Hence the last term in brackets is at most of order T/C .
Empirical Approaches
While in principle there could be many different approaches to estimating the
share of the cross-city variance that comes from sorting and the share that comes from
local interaction, we focus on the last implication of the model.  The taste and local
interaction related variance terms are not of order T/C  (i.e. they do not change with
average city size), while the sorting source of variance is of order T/C .  In principle,
then if we compared across sets of locations, where there is no migration between each
set of cities but there is migration within each set of cities, where the average city size
differs then we could determine the extent to which sorting determines the variance
across cities.  For example, if we found that the variance was much higher in areas with
larger city sizes then we would attribute much of the variance to sorting and less to local
interaction.
While in practice it is impossible to perform this sort of exercise perfectly, we
will present a crude facsimile using U.S. states.  Of course, for this estimation to be45
perfectly correct we would need to assume that all sorting occurs within states not
across states.  However, the estimation procedure would still be basically unbiased if
the means of the underlying taste distribution differed across states but the variance of
the taste distribution stayed constant or at least did not change in a way that was
systematically related to average city size.
We estimate the variance of weighted outcome variablesVar C kzwz ( ) within
each state, using the relationship between this variance and the variance of the
normalized sum of the deviations of actions of individuals in city z from the average
action of the population, and then regress this variance on the average city size within
the state.   The amount that remains in the intercept can be interpreted as the amount of
variance that can properly be attributed to social interaction. Table 4.5 shows our
estimates for three variables.  As a test case, in the third row of Table 4.5 we used
percent non-white, which should reveal variance only due to sorting.  The intercept in
this case was negative and statistically insignificant, which means that the methodology is
not inappropriately identifying social interaction in this case.
In the case of female-headed households and the crime rate, we find positive
levels of social interaction and significant levels of sorting.  In both cases, the sorting
effect is significantly positive.  In the case of the crime rate, the social interaction effect is
significantly positive.  In the case of female headed households, the social interaction
effect is not statistically significant, but it is economically sizable.  As a result, we must
conclude that this procedure shows promise but is far from precise.
Of course, it is worthwhile stressing that sorting itself only occurs because of
social interactions.  Similar individuals would not choose to locate near each other if
there weren't social interactions.  Hence, our results should be seen as estimating the46
extent to which social interactions operate through sorting or through interaction after
sorting.
V.  Dynamic Models
Many of the sorting problems just discussed disappear when considering time series
variation.  While we lose sources of variation, we do eliminate some of the hardest
problems of estimating social interactions.  In this case, we consider a simple class of
models in which all individuals start in a particular state and then may choose to switch
to another state (or action).  The switch is assumed to be irreversible, which admittedly
it will not be in many cases.  We have in mind choosing a particular technology or
moving to a new country or perhaps women entering the labor market (although in this
case, the decision is clearly reversible).
Descriptively, we will focus on the last example, despite the reversibility issue.
There are many reasons to suspect that there are substantial social interactions involved
in women entering the labor market.  As more women entered they lowered the stigma
of work, reduced the discrimination against women in the workplace and eliminated the
social network that facilitated not working in the formal labor market.
We model a single location with population n.  Each agent is indexed by an
integer i=1, 2, 3, ...., n.  At time t an individual i is in one of two states.  The state st
i=0,
if the agent has not entered the labor market, otherwise st
i=1.  We will assume that
entering the labor market is irreversible i.e. if st
i=1, and t'>t, then  s ¢  t 
i =1 .
Agent i's flow of utility per period depends on his type t ˛{0, 1, 2}, and on his
own state.  In addition if st
i=1 the utility also depends on the states of agents in a set
N(i) of "friends" of i, at the last time t1 such that st1
i =0.  In order to simplify the47
forecasting problem of agents, we assumed that although new workers benefit from the
presence of older entrants into the labor market that are their friends, the reverse is not
true.
5  We will begin by assuming that N(i)={i-1, i+1}.  For symmetry we identify 0
with n and n+1 with 1, i.e. we set N(1)={n, 2} and, N(n)={n-1,1}.  At each time t if
st
i=0, we assume that agent i will be given, with probability p a choice to enter the labor
market.  She then must compare the value of staying with the value of working that is a
function of her type and the states of her friends.  Let u t+1 = st
i-1 +st
i+1 and V(t,u)
denote the value of entering the labor marke, as a function of the type t and the value u
of the sum of the states in N(i) as of the preceding period.  Since it is only the value u, in
the period before entering the labor market that matters, if d is the discount factor per
period then V(t,u) =
d
1-d
h(t,u), where here h(t,u) is the per-period utility of an
individual that works, as a function of her type t, and the value u of the sum of the
states in N(i), in the period before she worked.  Similarly, let U(t,u) denote the value
of staying, as a function of the type t and the value u of the sum of the states in N(i), in
the preceding period.  Elementary dynamic programming implies that:
(21)U(t,ut-1) = g(t)+d[(1- p)E(U(t,ut)+ pE(max{U(t,ut),V(t,ut)})],
where g(t) is the per-period utility of an individual that stays outside the labor market as
a function of his type t and E denotes the expected value over the value of u t
conditional on u t-1. Individuals work whenever U(t,ut)<V(t,u t).  Since an agent
has a choice of never working, we known that U(t,ut)‡
1
1-d
g(t).
We make three assumptions:(A1)  h(0,u)< g(0), for any 0=u=2,(A2)
h(1,0)=h(1,1)=h(1,2) >g(1), and (A3)  h(2,0)<g(2)<h(2,1)=h(2,2).  Assumption A148
states that agents of type 0 get a higher flow of utility by not working.  Assumption A2
states that agents of type 1, do not care about the number of friends that work, but
always get a higher utility by working.  Assumption A3 states the additional benefit to a
type two agents from the previous working of a second friend.  In addition, the utility of
a type two agent not working is larger than that of working by herself, but lower than
that of working, if at least one fried works.  These assumptions makes the solution of
Problem 1.1 quite simple.  Type 0 will never work.  Type 1 will always work when she
is given a chance.  Type 2 will not work if none of her friends work.  Obviously we can
weaken the qualities assumed in the assumptions, and still retain the solution to problem
1.1 by combining hypotheses about the function h and g with hypotheses about the
discount factor d and the probability p.  Each agent is  type t with probability qt,
independent of the type of all other agents.
Given any i, let i- be the largest integer  less than i such that ti-?2, and let i+ be
the smallest integer greater than i such that ti+?2.  Here, again we identify n as the
predecessor of 1 and 1 as the successor of n. As t ﬁ ¥, st
i ﬁ1 unless ti-=ti+=0 in
which case st
i =0 for all t.  We write s
i for the asymptotic value of st
i.  The asymptotic
distribution of states can be derived in a manner similar to the derivation of the steady
state distribution in the models of Glaeser, Sacerdote and Scheinkman (1996).  In
particular, the expected fraction of workers converges to
m ”1-q0 -(1- q 0 -q1)
q0
2
(q0 +q1)
2 , whereq0 and q1 are the fractions of type zero
and type one respectively.  Furthermore, under the asymptotic distribution, if mn
denotes the fraction of  workers in  population of size n the (mn -m) n ﬁ N(0,s
2).
To establish this central limit behavior it is enough to observe that if j>j' and
Aj, ¢  j  is the event that at least for two values of j>i>j', ti ˛ {0,1} then conditional on49
Aj, ¢  j , s
j is independent of s
¢  j .  Since the probability of the complement of  Aj, ¢  j  goes to
zero exponentially as j-j' does to infinity, we know that mn displays central limit
behavior.  Furthermore the variance of the limit random variable s
2
 can be computed in
a standard way by calculating the covariance between s
j and s
¢  j  on the complement of
Aj, ¢  j .  The variance, s
2
, can be made arbitrarily large if we let the fraction of type 2
individuals converge to one-- the presence of individuals who are sensitive to social
interactions increases the variance across populations.
The dynamics are also possible to compute.  The expected number of workers
in the first period is npq1; the expected number of entrants in the second period is
np(1- p)q1 +2np
2
q1q2.  Hence if q2 >1/2 the expected number of entrants in the
second period is larger than in the first period.  This fact means that if  2 q  is large then
the expected cumulative migration starts as a convex function of time.  Eventually, the
expected number of workers converges to n 1-
q0
2
(q0 + q1)
2
￿ 
Ł 
￿  ￿ 
ł 
￿ .  This indicates that an S-
shaped cumulative entrant curve is to be expected.
6
Unfortunately we do not have closed form solutions that would allow us to
estimate these curves at this time.  Instead, we will present some results based on a
simpler method of estimating social interactions in a dynamic setting.
While this dynamic local interactions model needs further investigation, using
simulations it appears to be quite close to a dynamic global interactions model, many of
which have been studied extensively theoretically and empirically as well (as pioneered
by Griliches, 1958, see also Besley and Case, 1991).  While global interactions models
have appeared regularly in the literature on technological adoption so our presentation is
in no sense novel, in the spirit of collecting together a wide number of approaches to50
measuring social interactions, we present a particularly simple model here, without any
claims to innovation.   We assume that in each time period a fraction of individuals
(which is denoted b-X, where X(t) is the state variable for the number of workers)
receiving exogenous shocks inducing them to work.  Likewise all workers also interact
with another individual, who is drawn randomly  from the pool of individuals.  If a non-
worker interacts with a worker, then the non-worker will begin working.  Thus, there
are two sources of growth in the working population-- an exogenous rise due to
idiosyncratic shocks and a rise due to interactions, which will be global since individuals
meet with each other randomly (if individuals always only met their neighbors then this
would be a local interactions model).  Given these two processes, at each point in time
the fraction of non-workers who begin to work is a0+a1X(t).
While this differential equation is not that actually suggested by the previous
model, we know that we can fit the simulations of the model quite well (r-squareds
typically over 99.9%) with a differential equation of this form, so we believe that this
functional form is both reasonable and provides us with a convenient measure of the
degree of social interaction.  We thus have a differential equation of the form:
(22) X
•
(t) = (a0 +a1X(t))(b - X(t)) = a+bX(t)+cX(t)
2
This equation is meant to be flexible. Simulations showed that the time series
predicted by the previous model is well captured by a differential equation of this form.
The relative importance of the a1 term gives us the importance of social interactions (or
contagion) in the process; the relative importance of the a0 dictates the importance of
non-social related forces.  One interpretation of this equation, in the context of
technology adoption, is that a fraction of those individuals who haven't adopted (but will51
eventually adopt), adopts each period and a fraction adopts if and only if they meet
someone who has already adopted. The solution for this equation (conditional on
knowing the initial value) is:
(22) X(t) =
a1b -a0 -(a1b +a 0)Tanh -1
2
Log a0 +a1X(0)
a1b -a1X(0)
Ø 
º  Œ 
ø 
ß  œ - a1b +a 0
2
t
Ø 
º  Œ 
ø 
ß  œ 
2a1
where X(0) is the initial value.  This equation can itself be fit using maximum likelihood.
The estimate of b describes the final level of the action.    The a0 term tells us
about flat growth; the a1 term tells us about interactive growth.  When comparing
dynamic processes, if we compare a process which takes 50 years and a process which
takes 1 year to get close to b, both a terms will be much bigger in the faster process.
To avoid these issues, we normalize assuming a common T, for X(T)=Zb, where Z is a
parameter fixed by the econometrician (perhaps .95). This normalization essentially
means that each process is normalized so that it takes exactly the same amount of time
to run its course.  The normalization also means that only one free parameter (chosen to
be a1) other than b remains.  Different values of  a1=0. Figure 4.1 shows how
different values of This free parameter influences the S-shaped form of the process.
When a1 ˜0 the curve is concave. As there is more interaction, (a1 increases) the
adoption curve becomes more S-shaped.
7
To show the efficacy of this estimation procedure, we estimate curves for three
time processes which seem to be one-sided and social.  The first variable of interest is
to consider urbanization in the United States, which moved from 5.1% to 75% between
1790 and 1980.  Taking 1790 as year zero, and estimating .83 for b, and normalizing52
the period of urbanization to twenty years (which will be our standard normalized
period), our estimates become a0 =-.007[.001] and a1 =.33[.01].
8  The share of 17-
year olds who graduate from high school rises from 2% in 1870 to approximately 75%
in 1970, again following an S-shaped curve.  With 1870 as the base year, normalizing
and estimating .79 for b, we find that we estimate that a0 =-.077[.005] and a1
=.49[.01].  Using the third variable, the ratio of phone to households, we normalize and
find that we estimate that a0 =-.0005[.00003] and a1 =.56[.01].  The normalized
rankings suggest that phones are more interactive than schooling which is more
interactive than urbanization.  The following graph shows the results in the raw data.
The curve closest to the y-axis shows the results for urbanization.  The second curve
shows the schooling results and the final curve shows the results for telephones.
_____________________
FIGURE 4.1 goes here
____________________-53
VI.  Conclusion
This paper has presented a tour of primary issues in estimating social interactions.  A
first issue is estimating the extent to which the high variance of different processes should
be thought of as the result of multiple equilibria or high variances around those equilibria.
Following our first estimation technique, which essentially asks whether the distribution
of city variances is best fit by one or more distributions, we found that multiple
distributions fit the data better.  Our second estimation technique, which involves
examining the connection between prediction and actual city level outcomes, reveals no
evidence of multiple equilibria.  In both cases, we found that there was usually a large
component of the variance that was not explained by the existence of multiple equilibria.
A second issue is the extent to which interactions are due to local or global
interaction processes.  We show that the key to estimating which processes operate are
to have data at the sub-city level.  Using sub-city data tends to support the importance
of local (tract or sub-tract level) interactions relative to city level interactions.
A third issue is the extent to which interactions reflect sorting on tastes and the
extent to which they reflect social interactions after sorting occurs.  Of course, sorting
itself reflects the presence of some social interaction that induces like individuals to be
with each other.  We found large evidence of sorting behavior.
   Finally, we examined a simple dynamic model and used a simple methodology
that lets us compare the degree of social interactions across different dynamic
processes.54
Appendix
In this appendix we establish for the model in section III that (i) The average
action in a population of size n,  ˆ  A  n, converges, as n ﬁ ¥,  to a solution of the
equation:
(A1) g(A ) =
1-af
a(1-f)
A   ,
and (ii) ifai
n = A i
n - A, then
(A2)   
ai
n
n
ﬁ N 0,
sq
2
1-aj -a(1-j) ¢  g  A ( ) ( )
2
￿ 
Ł 
￿ 
￿ 
ł 
￿  i=1
n
￿
Define B  by:
(A3) B=(
1
1-af
)(
sup(q )
1-af
+
sup(g)
af
).
It follows from equation (8) in section III that, since A0
n = A n
n, then  A0
n £ B
and if  A i
n £ B then  A i+1
n £ B.  Hence for each n, i,  A i
n £ B, and  ˆ  A  n £ B. Also for
each i£ n,
(A4)
￿k „i Ak
n
n-1
- ˆ  A  n £
ˆ  A  n
n -1
-
A i
n
n-1
£
2B
n -1
Since  ¢  g (A) £ K for some K, we have that:55
(A5)   
1
n
￿
i=1
n
g(
￿ j„i Aj
n
n-1
) -g( ˆ  A  n) £
2BK
n-1
Using equation (10) from section III and the strong law of large numbers
0 )
1
(
) 1 ( ˆ ) 1 (
1
ﬁ
-
￿
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= n
A
g
n
A
n
k i k
n
i
n
f a
af  with probability one.
Hence using (A5) we have that with probability one:
(A6) (1-af) ˆ  A  n -a(1- f)g( ˆ  A  n)ﬁ 0 .
Since ˆ  A  n is a bounded sequence, it must have limit points. From equation (A6) we have
that any such limit point A  must satisfy g(A ) =
1-af
a(1-f)
A , i.e. (A1).
Since  ˆ  A  n - ˆ  A  n-1 £
2B
n
  and as equation (A1) has a finite number of fixed
points, all the limit points of a given sequence must coincide.  Hence  ˆ  A  n must in fact
converge to some A  that solves (A1), which establishes the first claim of this appendix.
Combining equations (A1) and (10) from section III and multiplying by  n , we
obtain:
(A7)  
].
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1
(
) ˆ ( )[ 1 (
)] ( ) ˆ ( )[ 1 ( ) ˆ )( 1 (
1
1
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Equation (A5) implies that the second term in the right hand side of (A7) converges to
0. Hence the Central Limit Theorem guarantees that the right hand side of (A7)
converges to a normal random variable with mean zero and variance sq
2.
We can now establish:
Proposition 1:   n( ˆ  A  n - A ) is bounded with probability 1.
Proof:  The right hand side of equation (A7) is bounded with probability 1. Suppose
that a subsequence nk has the property that  nk ˆ  A  nk - A ﬁ ¥. Dividing both sides of
equation (A7) by  nk ˆ  A  nk - A  and taking the limit as nk ﬁ ¥ we establish that
¢  g (A )=
1-af
a(1-f)
, what is a contradiction. We denote ai
n = A i
n - A . We know that:
(A8)
n(1-af)( ˆ  A  n -A )- na(1-f) ¢  g (A )( ˆ  A  n - A ) + na(1-f)o( ˆ  A  n - A )ﬁ N(0,sq
2)
.
Proposition 1 implies that  no( ˆ  A  n - A )ﬁ 0. Hence the second claim of this appendix
is established.57
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Table 4.1:
Estimation of Strength of Social Interactions Affecting
Female Headship Rates in Families
Varind Varagg a
1
Unadjusted Female
Headship Rate
2
.134 171.53 0.998
Rate Controlling for City
Level Observables
3
.132 52.09 0.995
Rate Controlling for
State Effects and City
Level Observables
4
.132 19.52 0.987
Source:  Individual level data are from the 1990 Census Public Use Micro Sample.  Aggregate data
are from the 1990 Census Summary Tape Files.
1. 
ind agg
ind agg
Var Var
Var Var
+
-
= a
2.  Varind is the individual-level variance.  It is the raw variance of the female headship
rate among families in the US.  Varagg is the adjusted variance of the city aggregate
rate.  It is the variance of  ( ) A A N c c -  where Nc is the number of families in the city,
Ac is the average action in the city, and  A is the average action in the US.
3.  The individual variance is the variance of the female headship rate, controlling for
city fixed effects.  The aggregate variance is the variance of  ￿ ￿
ł
￿
￿ ￿
Ł
￿
-
¢
-
a
b
1
c
c c
X
A N  where
a
b
- 1
c  is estimated from a city level regression of Ac on median family income, the
number of people aged less than 18 per family, and on the fraction of the population63
of families that is black, Hispanic, a high-school dropout, a college graduate, in
poverty, and headed by someone aged 15-24, 25-34, 35-44, 55-64 or 65-100.
All variables are defined for the population of family heads except the education
variables which are defined for the population over 18 years old.
4.  The individual variance is the variance of the female headship rate controlling for city
fixed effects.  The aggregate variance in this row is calculated in the same way as in
the second row of the table except that every raw variable is replaced with its
deviation from the state mean.64
Table 4.2:
Female Headship Rate
Local vs. Global Interactions
Varind Vartract Varcity aj
1 2
q s
1 ( ) ( ) j a - ¢ 1 A g
1
Raw Female Headship
Rate in Families
2
.134 10.74 171.53 0.975 0.0017 .025
Female Headship Rate
Controlling for
Individual Traits and
City Fixed Effects
3
.111 2.94 83.69 0.927 0.016 0.073
Female Headship Rate
Controlling for
Individual Traits and
State Effects
4
.111 2.92 36.23 0.927 0.016 0.073
Source:  1990 Census Summary Tape Files and Public Use Microsample
1.  ( ) ( ) ( ) city ind
tract ind
tract ind Var A g Var
Var Var
Var Var 2 2 2 2 1 1 1
1
1
q q s aj j a j a s aj - - = - ¢ - =
+
-
=
2.  Varind  is the individual variance from Table 4.1 row 1. Vartract is the average
across cities of the variance of adjusted tract averages:  ( ) c t t A A N - where Nt is
the population of families in the tract, At is the female headship rate in the tract,
and Ac is the average in the city.  Varcity is the aggregate variance from Table
4.1 row 1.65
3.  Varind  is the variance of the residual from the following micro-regression:
i i i X A e b + ¢ = where Ai is the deviation of the female headship rate from the city
mean and Xi is a vector of deviations of individual traits from city means.  These
traits include income and number of children and a set of dummies indicating
whether the family head is:  black, Hispanic, a high-school dropout, a college
graduate, aged 18-24, 25-34, 35-44, 55-64, 65-100, and in poverty.  Vartract
is the average across cities of the within-city variance of  ( ) c t t A A N ˆ ˆ -  where
t t t X A A b ˆ ˆ ¢ - = ,  b ˆ  is the vector of parameter estimates from the micro-level
regression, Xt is the vector of tract-level averages of individual traits (not
deviated from city means), and  c A ˆ  is the within-city average of  t A ˆ .  Finally,
Varcity is the variance of  ( ) A A N c c ˆ ˆ -  where, as for the tract level variables,
c c c X A A b ˆ ˆ ¢ - =  and  A ˆ is the national average of  c A ˆ .
4.  The variables in row 3 of the table are calculated in an analogous manner to
those in row 2 except that the aggregate variances are calculated controlling for
state fixed effects.66
TABLE 4.3:
Parameter Estimates for Global vs. Local Interactions Model
aj q s
2 ( ) ( ) j a - 1 ' A g
Female Headship Rate in Families 0.905775 0.001737 0.247777
Fraction of Population Over 5 in Same
House as 1985
0.991719 0.000017 0.004193
Unemployment Rate 0.959802 0.000093 0.076921
Fraction not in Labor Force 0.983460 0.000061 -0.015368
Fraction on Welfare 0.978419 0.000030 0.061562
Fraction in Poverty 0.992624 0.000011 0.014454
Fraction of Housing Owner Occupied 0.992535 0.000012 0.026431
Number of Cars -0.921217 16280.685916 -1.091941
Average Rent 0.9999996172960 0.00000000000015 0.000002
Source:
Aggregate Estimates:  1990 Census PMSA data. SA data
Individual Estimates:  1990 Census Public Use Microsample.
Note:
Variable of interest is:  sqrt(city population)*(city level rate-country
level mean)67
Table 4.3a:
Female Headship Rate of Families
Multiple Equilibria Model
1 (3 Component Distribution is Optimal)
Components of Distribution of Adjusted City Female Headship
Rates of Families
Average
Aggregate
Variance
2
( ) ( ) j a - ¢ 1 A g
3
First Second Third Fourth Fifth
Mean -2.93
Variance 171.02 171.02 .0250
Weight 1.00
Means -4.58 15.740
Variances 55.50 1097.40 139.89 .0250
Weights 0.92 0.08
Means -3.35 -5.17 32.75
Variances 120.77 12.52 1680.20 126.98 .0250
Weights 0.55 0.42 0.03
Means -5.02 -5.04 3.75 142.50
Variances 77.76 12.17 307.44 0 96.06 .0250
Weights 0.42 0.38 0.19 0
Means -8.18 -5.32 -1.96 4.38 142.50
Variances 71.40 10.22 46.21 306.07 0 89.32 .0250
Weights 0.25 0.31 0.25 0.19 068
Source:  1990 Census Summary Tape Files
1.  The adjusted PMSA female headship rate defined as  ( ) A A N c c -  where Nc  is
the city population of families, Ac is the city female headship rate among families,
and  A  is female headship rate in the US, is modeled as a random variable
distributed as a mixture of normals.  The mixtures are estimated using the em
algorithm.  The Akaike information criterion is minimized by the three component
distribution.
2.  The average aggregate variance is the weighted average of the variances of the
components of the overall distribution.
3.  As in Table 4.2,  ( ) ( ) city Var A g
2 1 1 q s aj j a - - = - ¢ .  
2    and    q s aj  are estimated
in Table 4.2 row 1 and Varcity is the average aggregate variance calculated in this
table.69
Table 4.3b:
Female Headship Rate of Families
Controlling for Individual Traits and City Fixed Effects
Multiple Equilibria Model
1 (3 component Distribution is Optimal)
Components of Distribution of Adjusted City Female
Headship Rates of Families
Average
Aggregate
Variance
2
( ) ( ) j a - ¢ 1 A g
3
First Second Third Fourth Fifth
Mean -2.72
Variance 83.44 83.44 .0728
Weight 1.00
Means -4.77 5.35
Variances 22.60 242.07 66.49 .0728
Weights 0.80 0.20
Means 0.90 -4.99 55.75
Variances 126.15 16.98 497.29 56.72 .0727
Weights 0.32 0.67 0.01
Means -3.33 -4.88 18.65 51.73
Variances 63.07 11.00 15.03 541.84 42.51 .0726
Weights 0.50 0.45 0.04 0.01
Means -3.42 -9.35 -4.44 18.61 51.74
Variances 61.33 1.38 8.45 15.12 541.72 41.88 .0726
Weights 0.53 0.04 0.39 0.04 0.0170
Source:  1990 Census Summary Tape Files
1.  The adjusted PMSA female headship rate controlling for individual traits and city
fixed effects is defined as  ( ) A A N c c ˆ ˆ -  as in Table 4.2 row 2.  This random
variable is modeled as a random variable distributed as a mixture of normals.  The
mixtures are estimated using the em algorithm.  The Akaike information criterion
is minimized by the three component distribution.
2.  The average aggregate variance is the weighted average of the variances of the
components of the overall distribution.
3.  As in Table 4.2,  ( ) ( ) city Var A g
2 1 1 q s aj j a - - = - ¢ .  
2    and    q s aj  are estimated
in Table 4.2 row 2 and Varcity is the average aggregate variance calculated in this
table.71
Table 4.3c:
Female Headship Rate of Families
Controlling for Individual Traits and State Effects
Multiple Equilibria Model
1 (2 Component Distribution is Optimal)
Components of Distribution of Adjusted City Female
Headship Rates of Families
Average
Aggregate
Variance
2
( ) ( ) j a - ¢ 1 A g
3
First Second Third Fourth Fifth
Mean -1.98
Variance 36.12 36.12 .0726
Weight 1.00
Means -2.81 1.03
Variances 8.97 121.67 33.76 .0726
Weights 0.78 0.22
Means -0.48 -2.92 50.59
Variances 67.86 7.10 0 26.54 .0724
Weights 0.32 0.68 0
Means -2.62 -3.03 -0.46 50.59
Variances 9.96 6.08 69.34 0 26.62 .0724
Weights 0.24 0.45 0.31 0
Means -14.51 -8.71 -2.95 0.41 23.10
Variances 16.39 0.16 6.57 46.29 347.86 21.57 .0723
Weights 0.02 0.01 0.66 0.29 0.0172
Source:  1990 Census Summary Tape Files
1.  The adjusted PMSA female headship rate controlling for individual traits and
state effects is defined as  ( ) A A N c c ˆ ˆ -  as in Table 4.2 row 3.  This random
variable is modeled as a random variable distributed as a mixture of normals.  The
mixtures are estimated using the em algorithm.  The Akaike information criterion
is minimized by the two component distribution.
2.  The average aggregate variance is the weighted average of the variances of the
components of the overall distribution.
3.  As in Table 4.2,  ( ) ( ) city Var A g
2 1 1 q s aj j a - - = - ¢ .  
2    and    q s aj  are estimated
in Table 4.2 row 3 and Varcity is the average aggregate variance calculated in this
table.73
Table 4.4:
Estimation of Strength of Social Interactions
Global vs. Local Interactions
Using Regression of Predicted City-Level Female Headship Rate
on Actual City-Level Rate
Var
1
ind Var
2
tract
( )
A
X f
¶
¶ 3
aj 4 ( ) X f
j Var +
2
q s
4 ( ) ( ) j a - ¢ 1 A g
4
Female Headship Rate
Controlling for
Individual Traits and
City Fixed Effects
.111 2.94 .792
(0.052)
0.927 0.016 -0.719
25
th percentile
3 .386
(.176)
-0.178
Source:  Individual level data are from the 1990 Census Summary Tape Files.  Aggregate
level data are from the 1990 Census Public Use Microsample.
1.  Varind  is the variance of the residual from the following micro-
regression:   i i i X A e b + ¢ = where Ai is the deviation of the female
headship rate from the city mean and Xi is a vector of deviations of
individual traits from city means.  These traits include income and
number of children and a set of dummies indicating whether the family
head is:  black, Hispanic, a high-school dropout, a college graduate,
aged 18-24, 25-34, 35-44, 55-64, 65-100, and in poverty.
2.  Vartract is the average across cities of the within-city variance of
( ) c t t A A N ˆ ˆ -  where  t t t X A A b ˆ ˆ ¢ - = ,  b ˆ  is the vector of parameter74
estimates from the micro-level regression, Xt is the vector of tract-level
averages of individual traits (not deviated from city means), and  c A ˆ  is
the within-city average of  t A ˆ .
3.    ( )
A
X f
¶
¶  is the slope estimated from a spline-regression of  c c X A b ˆ ˆ ¢ =  on
the actual rate, c A .  Row 1 is the estimate of the slope for those cities
above the 25
th percentile.  Row 2 is the estimate of the slope for cities
below the 25
th percentile.
4.  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
A
X f
A g Var
Var Var
Var Var
ind
tract ind
tract ind
¶
¶
- - = - ¢ - =
+
-
= aj j a j a s aj q 1 1 1
1
1 2 2 275
TABLE 4.5:
Sorting Equilibria:
Results from Regression Analysis
Equation Estimated is:
( ) l l l j j l N n k N e b b h + + = ) / ( var 1 0
0 b 1 b 2 R Varind a
Female Headship Rate of Families 39.42
(146.76)
0.005
(1.5E-05)
0.169 0.16 0.992
Crime Rate 30.88
(11.44)
2.6E-04
(1.2E-04)
0.095 0.06 0.996
Percent Non-white -299.39
(508.47)
0.018
(0.005)
0.201 1.88E-06 ---
Sources:  Regression data and the variances of crime and percent non-white are
derived from the County and City Data Book 1994 .  The female headship rate
data is from the 1990 Census Public Use Microsample.
Note:  Standard errors are in parentheses.  h  was estimated as:  ( ) A A i - N
where  N  is the average city size, Ai is the action, and A is the average of Ai.  kj
is 1/number of cities in the state. a  is calculated using the formula,
ind agg
ind agg
Var Var
Var Var
+
-
= a  where the intercept,  0 b , is used for Varagg and Varind is the
individual-level variance of the action in the US.76
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1Many of these ideas had antecedents in the classics works on social interactions, such
as Schelling (1978) which presents a discussion of a wide range of social interactions,
and Duesenberry (1949) who first formalizes interdependent preferences.   Jovanovic
(1985) is also a particularly prescient formalization of a social interactions model.
2 Akerlof, Katz and Yellen (1996) actually specifically link the rise in out-of-wedlock
births with changes in abortion and birth control, but this link is indirect and works
through the stigma associated with being an unwed mother or a delinquent father.
3Possible exceptions to this might occur when ?W/?q i >0 if individuals don't want to
take the action if no one else is taking the action, because it has no signaling value in that
case.  In that case, some consumers are necessary for their to exist the positive sorting
equilibrium.  Of course well established theory about reasonable beliefs when no one is
taking an action, argues that people's beliefs about off-the-equilibrium path behavior
should ensure that the action still has positive signaling value when no one is taking the
action.77
                                                                                                                                    
4Furthermore, it will eliminate the effect of any variables that are city, rather than
individual, specific.  Of course, it will not eliminate the problems of sorting across
neighborhoods.  That problem can only be solved with neighborhood fixed effects.
5In general this will still leave a forecasting problem for agents since they may be better
off waiting for their friends to act.  However, in our model we will assume that the gains
from acting are such that each type will either never act or act as soon as a certain
fraction of their friends have acted.
6We can also obtain an S-shaped curve where every agent interacts equally with every
other agent.  Under a global interactions model, we lose the variance across populations
over and above the characteristics of the populations.
7There is a literature on this topic which we are not referencing.  We apologize at this
point for failing to survey the technology adoption literature adequately at this point.
This excellent and lengthy literature is, of course, connected to this topic but too far
afield from our basic interest to be given significant page space.
8These errors are biased because we have treated the observations as independent,
further work will deal with the variety of standard time series issues involved in
estimating this non-linear trend.   The r-squared, which is again somewhat misleading is
99.62%, which is typical for these estimates.